

Student Name: _____

T° OIB History Theme 2
The Post-War Bipolar World and Challenges to Bi-polarization
(1945-1970s)

Chapter 2

A New Geopolitical Order – Emergence of the Developing World (1948-1970s)

This chapter shows how geopolitics of the Cold War interfered with the decolonization process and led to the emergence of new actors as the newly independent countries asserted their international role, thereby challenging the bi-polar order.



24th April 1955

The Afro-Asian Conference—popularly known as the Bandung Conference because it was held in Bandung, Indonesia—comes to a close on this day.

During the conference, representatives from 29 “non-aligned” nations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East met to condemn colonialism, decry racism, and express their reservations about the growing Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Chapter 2 Reference Points

- 1948- the birth of the State of Israel
- French Indochina War and the start of the Vietnam War
- 1962- Cuban Missile Crisis

Key Questions

1. What were the international consequences of the emergence of newly independent countries in the two decades following the end of WWII?
2. To what extent did newly independent countries challenge the bipolar world (1948 - 1970)?
3. Analyze the impact of the Bandung Conference of 1955, with the appearance of the decolonizing Afro-Asian bloc.
4. In what ways was the process of decolonization linked to the Cold War?
5. Why did the conflict in Algeria lead to the 5th French Republic?
6. Analyze the responses of the USA to each of the following:
 - a. the creation of the state of Israel, 1948*
 - b. the appearance of Mao's China, 1949*
 - c. the French defeat in Indochina, 1954
 - d. Castro's seizure of power in Cuba, 1959*

Learning Objectives

- ❖ **Analyze** how the Partition of Palestine came about and its consequences.
- ❖ **Evaluate** the extent to which Mao's foreign Policy challenged Cold War bipolarization from 1949 to 1972.
- ❖ **Understand** the causes and development of the Vietnam War through 1963.
- ❖ **Understand** the significance of the Bandung Conference and the extent of Non-Alignment
- ❖ **Contextualize** the significance of the Suez Crisis within the process of decolonization and during the Cold War
- ❖ **Understand** why the French 5th Republic resulted from the Algerian conflict
- ❖ **Analyze** the consequences of Castro coming to power in Cuba

Part One: Decolonization and the Cold War

Objectives

- **Understand** the significance of the Bandung Conference and the extent of Non-Alignment.
- **Analyze** the impact of the Bandung Conference of 1955, with the appearance of the decolonizing Afro-Asian bloc.

Decolonization: Key Terms

Bandung Conference: First large-scale Asian–African or Afro–Asian Conference was a meeting of 29 Asian and African states, most of which were newly independent, which took place on 18–24 April 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia. They were united in opposition to colonialism and this marked the emergence of the Third World on the international stage.

Decolonization: the act or process of a state withdrawing from a former colony, leaving it independent.



Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel Treaty): an agreement between India and China signed on 24th April 1954 which governed relationships between states and are listed as:

1. mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. mutual non-aggression,
3. mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
4. equality and mutual benefit, and
5. peaceful co-existing

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964): First Prime Minister of India from 1947 until 1964.

New Geopolitical World Order: refers to the period following the end of WW2 and the emergence of the Cold War dominated by the creation of a bi-polar world opposing East and West (communism and capitalism) and the backdrop of the process of decolonization occurring in Asia, India and Africa which heralded the rise of the non-aligned movement.

Non-Aligned Movement: Established in 1961 in Belgrade as a forum of developing states that were not aligned to any power bloc.

Third World: Name for countries which were not aligned with either the capitalist First World or Communist Second World.

Source 1: Extracts from President Sukarno’s Opening Speech at the Bandung Conference, 18th April, 1955

No task is more urgent than that of preserving peace. Without peace our independence means little. The rehabilitation and up-building of our countries will have little meaning. Our revolutions will not be allowed to run their course. . . . What can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We can mobilise all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Yes, we! We, the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1,400,000,000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilise what I have called the Moral Violence of Nations in favour of peace. We can demonstrate to the minority of the world which lives on the other continents that we, the majority, are for peace, not for war.

Source 2: Jawaharlal Nehru on Nonalignment – speech in Washington D.C., 18th December 1956

The preservation of peace forms the central aim of India’s policy. It is in the pursuit of this policy that we have chosen the path of nonalignment in any military or like pact of alliance [including Cold War alliances]. Nonalignment does not mean passivity of mind or action, lack of faith or conviction. It does not mean submission to what we consider evil. It is a positive and dynamic approach to such problems that confront us. We believe that each country has not only the right to freedom but also to decide its own policy and way of life. Only thus can true freedom flourish and a people grow according to their own genius. We believe, therefore, in nonaggression and non-interference by one country in the affairs of another and the growth of tolerance between them and the capacity for peaceful coexistence. We think that by the free exchange of ideas and trade and other contacts between nations each will learn from the other and truth will prevail. We therefore endeavour to maintain friendly relations with all countries, even though we may disagree with them in their policies or structure of government. We think that by this approach we can serve not only our country but also the larger causes of peace and good fellowship in the world.

Activity One (Objective – paragraph response)
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- ❖ What do you understand by the term ‘nonalignment’ after studying these two documents? Cite pertinent supporting evidence in your explanation.

US Department of State Archives

Document 1

Between 1945 and 1960, three dozen new states in Asia and Africa achieved autonomy or outright independence from their European colonial rulers. There was no one process of decolonization. In some areas, it was peaceful, and orderly. In many others, independence was achieved only after a protracted revolution. A few newly independent countries acquired stable governments almost immediately; others were ruled by dictators or military juntas for decades, or endured long civil wars. Some European governments welcomed a new relationship with their former colonies; others contested decolonization militarily. The process of decolonization coincided with the new Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States, and with the early development of the new United Nations.

Decolonization was often affected by superpower competition, and had a definite impact on the evolution of that competition. It also significantly changed the pattern of international relations in a more general sense. The creation of so many new countries, some of which occupied strategic locations, others of which possessed significant natural resources, and most of which were desperately poor, altered the composition of the United Nations and political complexity of every region of the globe.

Nearly all of the United States' European allies believed that after their recovery from World War II their colonies would finally provide the combination of raw materials and protected markets for finished goods that would cement the colonies to Europe. Whether or not this was the case, the alternative of allowing the colonies to slip away, perhaps into the United

States' economic sphere or that of another power, was unappealing to every European government interested in post war stability. Although the U.S. Government did not force the issue, it encouraged the European imperial powers to negotiate an early withdrawal from their overseas colonies. The United States granted independence to the Philippines in 1946. However, as the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union came to dominate U.S. foreign policy concerns in the late 1940s and 1950s, the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations grew increasingly concerned that as the European powers lost their colonies or granted them independence, Soviet-supported communist parties might achieve power in the new states. This might serve to shift the international balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union and remove access to economic resources from U.S. allies. Events such as the Indonesian struggle for independence from the Netherlands (1945-50), the Vietnamese war against France (1945-54), and the nationalist and professed socialist takeovers of Egypt (1952) and Iran (1951) served to reinforce such fears, even if new governments did not directly link themselves to the Soviet Union. Thus, the United States used aid packages, technical assistance and sometimes even military intervention to encourage newly independent nations in the Third World to adopt governments that aligned with the West. The Soviet Union deployed similar tactics in an effort to encourage new nations to join the communist bloc, and attempted to convince newly decolonized countries that communism was an intrinsically non-imperialist economic and political ideology. Many of the new nations resisted the pressure to be drawn into the Cold War, joined in the "nonaligned movement," which formed after the [Bandung conference](#) of 1955, and focused on internal development.

The newly independent nations that emerged in the 1950s and the 1960s became an important factor in changing the balance of power within the United Nations. In 1946, there were 35 member states in the United Nations; as the newly independent nations of the "third world" joined the organization, by 1970 membership had swelled to 127. These new member states had a few characteristics in common; they were non-white, with developing economies, facing internal problems that were the result of their colonial past, which sometimes put them at odds with European countries and made them suspicious of European-style governmental structures, political ideas, and economic institutions. These countries also became vocal advocates of continuing decolonization, with the result that the UN Assembly was often ahead of the Security Council on issues of self-governance and decolonization. The new nations pushed the UN toward accepting resolutions for independence for colonial states and creating a special committee on colonialism, demonstrating that even though some nations continued to struggle for independence, in the eyes of the international community, the colonial era was ending.

US Dept of State Archive

<https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/cwr/98782.htm>

Document 2

In April, 1955, representatives from twenty-nine governments of Asian and African nations gathered in Bandung, Indonesia to discuss peace and the role of the Third World in the Cold War, economic development, and decolonization.

The core principles of the Bandung Conference were political self-determination, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, and equality. These issues were of central importance to all participants in the conference, most of which had recently emerged from colonial rule. The governments of Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka co-sponsored the Bandung Conference, and they brought together an additional twenty-four nations from Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Because the decolonization process was still ongoing, the delegates at the conference took it upon themselves to speak for other colonized peoples (especially in Africa) that had not yet established independent governments. The delegates built upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, worked out in negotiations between India and China in 1954, as they sought to build solidarity among recently independent nations.

At the close of the Bandung Conference attendees signed a communiqué that included a range of concrete objectives. These goals included the promotion of economic and cultural cooperation, protection of human rights and the principle of self-determination, a call for an end to racial discrimination wherever it occurred, and a reiteration of the importance of peaceful coexistence. The leaders hoped to focus on the potential for collaboration among the nations of the third world, promoting efforts to reduce their reliance on Europe and North America.

The Bandung Conference and its final resolution laid the foundation for the nonaligned movement during the Cold War. Leaders of developing countries banded together to avoid being forced to take sides in the Cold War contest. The initial motivation for the movement was the promotion of peace. In the 1970s it grew increasingly radical in its condemnation of the policies of the Cold War super powers. Although the nonaligned movement continued until the end of the Cold War, the solidarity produced by the "spirit of Bandung" had weakened by end of the 1960s, by which time most of the original participants in the conference were no longer in power in their respective countries.

The United States Government initially viewed the Bandung Conference, and the nonaligned movement that emerged from it, with caution. Observers in the United States expressed concern that the meeting was a sign of a leftward shift in the ideological leanings of the newly independent nations of Africa and Asia. Moreover, the conference revealed two contradictions in U.S. foreign policy with regard to decolonization in the Third World. First, the United States Government found itself caught between its desire to support decolonization and self-determination in Southeast Asia and Africa and its reliance on the colonial powers of Western Europe as allies against the communist Eastern Bloc. Cooperation with Britain, France and the Netherlands was vital to U.S. policy in Europe, but supporting decolonization would be tantamount to opposing those allies. Second, the conference coincided with a fundamental shift in U.S. race relations. The 1954 *Brown v. the Board of Education* decision had declared school segregation unconstitutional, but the process of ending the Jim Crow laws in the American South was long and difficult. Many countries around the world, particularly newly independent nations, followed the U.S. Civil Rights Movement with interest and questioned the extent to which U.S. rhetoric of equality and self-determination matched the status of civil rights in the United States. U.S. leaders worried that the anti-colonialism of Bandung and the discussion of global racial politics taking place there could turn anti-American or anti-Western.

Pillar One: The Creation of Israel and the Arab response (Suez Crisis and Nasserism, 1956)

Focus of study:

- Emergence of Zionism & Arab nationalism
- Intervention of foreign powers (superpowers & former colonial powers)
- Arab-Israeli Conflicts/ Wars

Objective

- **Analyze** how the Partition of Palestine came about and its consequences.

Pillar One Key Terms

Aswan Dam: built across the Nile between 1960 and 1970 with a US financial loan of \$270 million which feared communism would spread in the Middle East, however the USA subsequently withdrew funding.

Baghdad Pact, 1955: also known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), it was a Middle East Treaty Organization between the UK, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. It was part of a strategy to keep the Middle East free from Soviet influence and functioned as an intergovernmental military alliance until dissolution in 1979 following the Iranian revolution.

Balfour Declaration: a public statement by the British government issued in 1917 announcing support for the establishment of a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, then part of the Ottoman Empire.

David Ben Gurion: (1886-1973) one of the founders and first Prime Minister of Israel who proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel on 14th May 1948.

Czech Arms Deal (1955): an agreement between the USSR and Egypt to supply Egypt with \$83 million dollars worth of Soviet weapons through Czechoslovakia. Historians agree this deal led Israel to plan a war against Egypt which culminated in the Suez Crisis.

Deir Yassin: a massacre which took place on April 9th, 1948, when Zionist paramilitary groups attacked this village of 600 inhabitants, killing 107 of them. Stories of atrocities helped trigger the 1948 Palestinian exodus.

IDF: Israel Defense Forces, which is unique in its inclusion of mandatory conscription of women and is believed to have had an operational nuclear weapons capability since 1967.

Nasser(ism): a socialist Arab nationalist ideology based on the thinking of Egypt's second President, Gamel Abdel Nasser Hussain (1918-1970). It was opposed to Western capitalism and rejected communism and viewed Zionism as an extension of European colonialism on Arab soil.

Partition: United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine was a UN proposal which recommended a partition of Mandatory Palestine at the end of the British Mandate. It was adopted as UN Resolution 181 (ii). Although it was accepted by the Jewish Agency for Palestine it was rejected by Arab leaders and civil war broke out when the plan was not implemented.

1947-48 Civil war in Mandatory Palestine: Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine clashed while the British organised their withdrawal and only occasionally intervened. When the British Mandate expired on 14th May 1948 and the State of Israel was declared, the surrounding Arab states (Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq and Syria) immediately attacked thus escalating the conflict into the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.

Suez Crisis: Began on October 29th 1956 when Israeli armed forces (in secret prior agreement with France and the UK) pushed into Egypt towards the Suez Canal after Nasser nationalized the canal, a valuable waterway that controlled 66% of the oil used by Europe.

Voice of the Arabs: one of the first and most prominent Egyptian transnational Arabic language radio services on which President Nasser used to spread his messages on Arab unity and revolutions across the Arab world.

Zionism: an ideology and nationalist movement among the Jewish people that promotes the re-establishment of and support for a Jewish State in the territory defined as the historic land of Israel.

Zionism and Arab Nationalism – how Israel came about

Document 1:

Zionist policy in Palestine before the Second World War

The Jews in Palestine were represented by the **Jewish Agency**. This was effectively the government of the Jewish population in Palestine. It shaped Zionist policy in Palestine: for instance, it made decisions about Jewish settlements and the education of Jewish children. In 1937, the Jewish Agency had agreed to the British plan to divide Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. But even then, many Palestinian Jews foresaw that they would have to fight to defend a Jewish state. They knew that the Arabs would never agree to it. Furthermore, some Jewish leaders wanted *all* Palestine to be made into a Jewish state.

One of these was David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the Jewish Agency. He accepted the 1937 plan for the partition of Palestine with independent Jewish and Arab states. But he always hoped for more: he assumed that an independent state would allow for unlimited Jewish immigration, the development of a strong economy and the organisation of a powerful army. Then, after that, as he said in a letter to his son:

I am certain we will be able to settle in all the other parts of the country, whether through agreement and mutual understanding with our Arab neighbours or in another way.

So, although the official policy of the Jewish Agency was to accept a Jewish state in *part* of Palestine, alongside an Arab one, Ben-Gurion and some other leaders hoped for a Jewish state in *all* of Palestine.

In 1939, the British decided *not* to partition Palestine (see page 14). This was a setback to Jewish hopes for a separate Jewish state but the Zionists were not about to give in. They began to campaign against the British policy. Then came the outbreak of the Second World War and most Palestinian Jews decided to support Britain in the fight against Nazi Germany. Many fought in the British army which, in the long term, would enable them to gain valuable military experience and, even, weapons. This would serve them well when the state of Israel was created.

From 1939 onwards, the British were preoccupied with winning the war against Germany. They gave little thought to the future of Palestine and maintained their policy of controlling Jewish immigration so as not to antagonise the Arabs. Then, in 1944, towards the end of the war, a British government committee discussed partition again only to abandon the idea after Lord Moyne, a government minister, was murdered by the **Stern gang**, a Jewish terrorist organisation.

Activity Three: Paragraph response

❖ What was Zionist policy in Palestine in the 1930s?

Ideas to include: Jewish Agency / prospect of Partition / David Ben-Gurion / experience of WW2

Document 2:

US support for a Jewish state

The Zionists also decided that the USA, not Britain, was now the country they needed to have on their side. Only the USA, one of the two superpowers that emerged after the war, could put enough pressure on Britain to agree to a separate Jewish state and leave Palestine. The Zionists had the support of the Jewish population in the USA who could, in turn, put pressure on the US government. There were four and a half million Jewish Americans, two million of them in New York city alone. By the end of the war, nearly all of them were Zionists, convinced of the need to establish an independent Jewish state for the Jewish refugees who had survived the Nazi Holocaust in Europe.

As early as May 1942, when news was only just beginning to emerge of the Nazi extermination of the Jews, the American Zionist conference had declared their support for a 'Jewish commonwealth' in *all* of Palestine. This became known as the Biltmore Declaration after the name of the hotel in New York in which the conference was held.

After the war, American Zionists, often joined by Jewish leaders from Palestine, launched a propaganda offensive: they addressed meetings, held rallies, placed advertisements and, above all, **lobbied** members of the US government and Congress, in order to win support. In April 1946, the US President, Harry Truman, called on the British government to allow the immediate entry of 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine. Six months later, he came out in support of the partition of Palestine.

Intervention of foreign powers (superpowers & former colonial powers) and conflicts

Document 3:

The Jewish Agency in Palestine officially accepted the plan despite the exclusion of Jerusalem from the Jewish state: the Jews in Palestine were pleased that they now had international support for the idea of a Jewish state. But not all of them were happy with the plan: not only was Jerusalem excluded from the Jewish state but many Jewish settlements were to be included in the Arab state. Menachem Begin, leader of Irgun, announced:

The partition of the homeland is illegal. It will never be recognised. It will not bind the Jewish people. Jerusalem was and will forever be our capital. **Eretz Israel** will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And for ever.

David Ben-Gurion said:

Tens of thousands of our youth are prepared to lay down their lives for the sake of Jerusalem. It is within the boundaries of the state of Israel just as Tel Aviv is.

The **Arab Higher Committee**, representing the Palestinian Arabs, rejected the UN partition plan, especially as the Jews were to be given the larger area. The Arabs did not wish to give up any of their land. They felt that the Western powers should find a home for the Jews elsewhere.

Vocabulary: **Eretz Israel** - the Land of Israel as in the Bible – this meant the whole of Palestine, not just the area allocated by the UN.

Activity Five: Short Response

❖ What was the response to the UNSCOP report?

Document 4:

Civil war in Palestine, November 1947 to May 1948

A few days after the UN voted for partition, the Arab Higher Committee proclaimed a three-day strike which led to outbreaks of violence against Jewish civilians. However, the Jewish Agency and its forces were ready to respond. They had always known that the Arabs would resist the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. In December, when the British announced that they would leave Palestine in May 1948, the fighting between Arabs and Jews intensified. At first, the Jewish forces acted defensively: they sought to hold on to and defend the land they had been allocated by the UN. However, they soon also went on the offensive and fought to gain control of Jewish settlements in the land allocated to the Arabs and of the roads leading to them.

In 1948, soldiers from Syria and Iraq began to cross into Palestine to help the Arabs. Again, this was no surprise to the Jewish leaders. They fully expected neighbouring Arab states to invade Palestine when the British left and the new Jewish state came into existence. So they resolved to secure control over Jewish territory. In March the Haganah came up with Plan D, the aim of which was to:

- take over any installations evacuated by the British, especially military bases
- expel as many Palestinians as possible from the future Jewish state.

Already, by February 1948, many of the Palestinian élite, such as landowners and business people, had left Palestine. This contributed to feelings of insecurity among the Arab masses, especially in the villages, and encouraged others to leave. Then, in April 1948, Jewish forces began the forcible expulsion of Arabs from villages inside what was to become the Jewish state. Nearly all of the villages along the coast from Tel Aviv to Haifa (see the map on page 20) were cleared of their Arab populations. Armed Jewish forces surrounded each village on three sides, forcing the villagers to flee through the fourth side. If the people refused to leave, they were often forced on to lorries and driven away to Transjordan. Similarly, Jewish forces took over mixed Arab–Jewish towns like Jaffa and Haifa. In Haifa, where explosions were set off by Jewish forces in Arab areas of the city, nearly all of the Arab population of 100,000 fled.

Activity Six: Short focused responses

a) Why was there a civil war in Palestine?

b) How did Jewish leaders resolve to establish control across Jewish territory?

Document 5:

The battle for Jerusalem

There was a particularly bitter struggle to control the roads leading to Jerusalem and massacres of civilians were carried out by both sides. Some of the massacres by Jewish forces were in retaliation for Palestinian attacks on Jewish settlements or on convoys trying to supply the Jewish population of Jerusalem. However, the targets for Jewish attacks were not random: they were carefully chosen. They were intended to rid the future Jewish state of as many Arabs as possible. In the weeks before the British withdrawal from Palestine, some of the bloodiest fighting took place in and around Jerusalem. In one well-known incident, in April 1948, Irgun fighters, led by Menachem Begin, attacked the village of Deir Yassin (which was inside what was to be Arab territory under the UN plan) and killed the inhabitants. They said they believed it was an Arab headquarters. The effects of incidents like this were dramatic. As Begin himself wrote later:

The Arabs began to flee in terror even before they clashed with Jewish forces. ... Arab propaganda spread a legend of terror amongst Arabs and Arab troops, who were seized with panic at the mention of Irgun soldiers. The legend was worth half a dozen battalions to the forces of Israel.

By 14 May 1948, when the British finally withdrew from Palestine, over 300,000 Arabs had left what was to become the new Jewish state. This was a victory for the Jews but a disaster for the Arabs.

Vocabulary: The Arabic word 'Nakbah' for disaster or catastrophe' is used to refer to the 1948-49 war and creation of the Palestinian refugee problem.

Activity Seven: Paragraph response

❖ Who won and who lost the war?

Justify your decisions with supporting evidence.

Suez Crisis and Nasserism, 1956

Before studying the Suez Crisis in 1956 it is important to know something about Nasser, President of Egypt from 1954 until his death in 1970.

Arab Nationalism

This was a movement striving for Arab political unity rooted in a feeling of sharing the same language, Arabic, and (for the most part) the same religion, Islam. It also had a political dimension: the desire for Arab political unity, even to establish a single Arab state.

Arab Nationalism emerged as a growing political movement in the 1930s due to increasing Jewish immigration to Palestine. Opposition to Zionism was the one issue on which all Arabs in the Middle East could agree.

Whilst there was growing support for a single Arab state among the urban educated elite in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq, most Arab governments did not want to merge and form a single state. However, they did show their solidarity by forming the Arab League in 1945 at the Cairo Conference. The subsequent emergence of the State of Israel and the defeat of invading Arab armies united the Arabs in hatred of the new Jewish State.

Egypt and Nasser

The defeat of Egypt in the war against Israel was a catalyst that led the Egyptian army to overthrow the monarchy. Nasser and his fellow army officers were appalled at the incompetence of the Egyptian government and overthrew it in 1952. In order to establish Egyptian independence they removed the British troops stationed at the Suez Canal by agreement with the British government in 1954. However, it was agreed that British officials would continue to operate the canal and this remained a symbol of Western domination.

In the 1950s, the British and the Americans tried to persuade Nasser's government to join an anti-Soviet alliance. This was the era of the **Cold War** and the Western powers wished to contain the spread of Soviet power and influence. When the Americans explained to Nasser what a threat Soviet Russia was, he pointed out that it was '5000 miles away'. For him, it was the Western powers and Israel that posed the greater threat to Egypt's stability and independence. Nasser wished to stay independent of any pro-Western alliance. This neutral stand made the Western powers suspicious because they saw things through Cold War eyes: if Egypt was not *for* them, they suspected it must be against them.

The Baghdad Pact the 'Voice of the Arabs'

The Baghdad Pact 1955

In 1955, at the height of the Cold War, the British formed an anti-Soviet alliance with Turkey and Iran. They tried to persuade the government of Iraq, which was an Arab state, to join. Nasser was furious. He did not want any Arab state to join. It seemed that the British were interfering in Arab affairs again, as they had been doing for much of the twentieth century. Nasser saw the **Baghdad Pact**, as the alliance became known, as an instrument of Western intervention and he feared that Jordan, Lebanon and Syria might also be seduced into joining. That would leave Egypt very isolated. He launched a massive propaganda campaign to prevent Iraq from joining.

‘Voice of the Arabs’

To do this, Nasser made use of the Arab world’s biggest radio station, the ‘Voice of the Arabs’, which was broadcast from Cairo and reached millions in the Arab world. Radios were set up in cafés and in village squares. Dozens of people listened to each radio. In this way, Nasser could appeal to the Arab peoples, sometimes against the wishes of their governments. As the radio station declared: ‘The Voice of the Arabs speaks for the Arabs, struggles for them and expresses their unity.’

Nasser’s main aim was to preserve the power of Egypt but he recognised the wide appeal of Arab nationalism. Through the power of the radio (at a time before television was common) he could strengthen both the power of Egypt and his own leadership of the Arab world. Egypt was the leading Arab state and the strongest military power in the Arab world. Now it had the radio with which to dominate other Arab powers and defy the West.

Cairo radio already had a huge audience throughout the Arab world because Egyptian music was so popular. Egyptian singers (and Egyptian film stars) were famous across the whole of the Middle East. Now the voice of Nasser was also heard by millions and they thrilled to his mesmerising speeches. The Arab masses, particularly in the cities where they had more access to radio, responded with huge enthusiasm. The ‘Voice of the Arabs’ appealed to Arabs of all classes and across national borders. It went to the heart of Arab politics. In this way, Arab nationalism became an increasingly strong, unifying movement and Nasser was its champion.

Nasser’s opposition to what he saw as Western imperialism won so much Arab support that only Iraq, out of all the Arab states, was able to join the Baghdad Pact. Public opinion in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria was swept along by Nasser’s oratory and made it impossible for their governments to join the pact. It was Egypt’s opposition to any Western alliance that was thus the main contributor to the rise of Arab nationalism in the 1950s.


Activity Eight: Paragraph response

a) What were the strands (components / constituents / ties) of Arab nationalism?

b) Why did Nasser view the West as a threat?

c) What was the significance of Nasser's campaign against the Baghdad Pact and what role did the 'Voice of the Arabs' play in promoting the power of Egypt within the Arab world?

The Suez Crisis



Nasser decided that Egypt would **nationalise** the Canal and Egyptians would run it themselves. They would use the profits to build the Aswan Dam. He said that Britain and France could 'choke on their rage'. This daring act thrilled the Arabs in Egypt and elsewhere.

Britain and France were furious. The British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, was determined not to let Nasser 'have his thumb on our windpipe'. The British and French withdrew their pilots who guided ships through the Canal. But the Egyptians kept it running and the traffic increased. The French saw Nasser as 'Hitler on the Nile'. They were determined not to **appease** Nasser as they had appeased Hitler in the 1930s. They had already agreed to sell Israel over 70 fighter planes and 200 tanks. Now they held secret meetings with the Israelis in order to plot Nasser's downfall. The French had an added reason for wishing to topple Nasser: they accused him of sending weapons and other

aid to support the Algerians in their fight for independence from France.

In October the British joined the French and Israelis. On 24 October, the British and French Foreign Ministers secretly met the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, in France. Ben-Gurion wished to end the border raids from Gaza and force Egypt to recognise the state of Israel. He also wanted to break the Egyptian **blockade** of the Tiran Straits which prevented Israeli ships from reaching the port of Eilat (see the map below). Furthermore, he was worried about the increasing military strength of Egypt and the fact that the armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan had been put under the same command. Britain, France and Israel held further high-level meetings. Although it was denied at the time, a joint campaign against Egypt was being planned.

The fighting over Suez

On 29 October 1956, Israeli forces invaded Egypt. They advanced across Sinai towards the Suez Canal (see the map below). The next day, the governments of Britain and France ordered Egypt and Israel to cease fighting and withdraw 10 miles from the Canal. If either side refused, the British and French

would use force. The Israelis were still a long way from the Canal and they agreed but the Egyptians refused to withdraw from the Canal because it was Egyptian territory.

On 31 October, British and French planes bombed Egyptian airfields and destroyed most of their air force. They also bombed Port Said, the city at the northern end of the Canal (see the photograph above). On 5 November, British and French troops landed at Port Said and advanced along the Canal. Egypt responded by sinking ships, which had been filled with concrete, in order to obstruct the British and French advance along the Canal.

At the UN, the Arab states condemned the Anglo-French action. They halted oil supplies to the West. Even worse for Britain was the fact that its strongest ally, the USA, condemned the action. The US government was furious that Britain and France had used force. The Americans believed the Anglo-French action would lose the support of Arab states at a time when the USA was keen to win and make friends in the Arab world. The US government threatened to cut off financial aid to Britain, which would ruin the economy. The Soviet Union went further and threatened to use military force. On 6 November, the UN declared a ceasefire and ordered the British and French to withdraw. A UN emergency force was sent to the Canal.

Winners and losers in the Suez War

Nasser: hero of the Arab world

Nasser, the Egyptian leader, became the hero of the Arab world. He had stood up to Britain and France, who had dominated the Middle East for so long. He had gained complete control of the Suez Canal and of a large quantity of British military stores. With US aid the Canal was cleared and reopened in April 1957. Although Egypt lost territory when the Israelis captured Sinai, the Israelis were persuaded, by the Americans, to withdraw early in 1957. Besides, Nasser could claim that the Egyptian army had only been defeated because the Israelis had British and French support.

The Israelis

The Israelis also made gains. The speed of their victory over Egyptian forces in Gaza and Sinai had proved that the Israeli Defence Forces were the strongest in the Middle East. When they withdrew from Sinai, UN troops moved in to guard the border between Egypt and Israel. In particular, UN forces were sent to Gaza to prevent more raids on Israel and to Sharm-el-Sheikh (see map on page 42) to guard the passage of Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran.

b) What were the consequences of the war?

Pillar Two: Emergence of Mao's China (1949 - 1972)

Focus of study:

- a) Cold War alliance with the USSR before Sino-Soviet Split, 1950-1962
- b) Securing borders & challenging US in the Cold War (Tibet annexation, 1950, intervention in Korean War & sabre-rattling in Taiwan Straits, 1954)
- c) Testing nuclear weapon, 1964
- d) Support of African anti-colonial independence movements in the 1960s to gain diplomatic allies in the push for a seat in the United Nations Security Council.

Objective

❖ **Evaluate** the extent to which Mao's foreign Policy challenged Cold War bipolarization from 1949 to 1972.

Pillar Two Key Terms

5-Year Plans: a series of social and economic development initiatives, the first five year plan covered 1953 – 57 and was based on state ownership of large modern industry and large collective units in agriculture. With the aid of the Soviet Union, steel production increased from 1.35 million metric tons in 1953 to 5.35 million metric tons by 1957 and coal production also rose 98% between 1952 and 1957.

Collectivisation: From 1950 the government encouraged farmers to create mutual aid teams (huzhuzu) which were initially seasonal. By 1953 around 400 000 cooperatives existed representing 7% of all peasant families, though this had risen to 15% by 1955 however they were principally located in the northwestern region which has been dominated by communists since the 1930s.

Cultural Revolution: a socio-political movement from 1966 to 1976 launched by Mao Zedong intended to preserve Chinese Communism (and Maoism) by purging the remnants of capitalist and traditionalist elements from Chinese society.

Great Leap Forward: name of the Second Five Year Plan from 1958 to 1962 which aimed to modernize the countryside through the formation of people's communes – it resulted in tens of millions of deaths from famine.

Maoism: also known as Mao Zedong Thought. This was a type of Marxism-Leninism developed to create a socialist revolution in Chinese agricultural society by focusing on the peasantry rather than the proletariat (as under Marxism-Leninism).

Mao Zedong (1893-1976): Chinese communist revolutionary who was the founder of the People's Republic of China (PRC) which he ruled as Chairman of the Communist Party from its foundation in 1949 until 1976.

Cold War alliance with the USSR before Sino-Soviet Split, 1950-1962

Mao's China and the USSR

Since Stalin's uncompromising manner had been a major factor in causing disharmony between Moscow and Beijing, it was reasonable to expect that after the Soviet leader's death in 1953 relations would ease. This appeared to happen at first; something of a Sino-Soviet honeymoon period intervened in the mid-1950s. The new Soviet leaders were willing to provide China with further loans and technology. But even as better relations developed, events undermined the possibility of a genuine partnership.

In February 1956, Nikita Khrushchev staggered the Communist world by launching a detailed attack on Stalin for his 'crimes against the party'. A particular charge that rang alarm bells in China was that Stalin had put himself above the party by engaging in a 'cult of personality' (see page 85). While Mao had had profound differences with Stalin, he was deeply disturbed by the ferocity of this assault on Stalin's record. He read the denunciation of the cult of personality as an intended criticism of his own style of leadership in China.

Mao was also disturbed by the political developments that occurred in the **Eastern bloc** in the wake of the de-Stalinisation programme. Greater freedom appeared to be offered to the **Soviet satellites** to criticise their Communist governments and to question their subordination to the USSR. This had not been Khrushchev's intention, as he was quick to demonstrate by ordering the

suppression of an anti-Soviet rising in Hungary in November. But for Mao the Hungarian rising and those that had also occurred in Poland and East Germany were the direct result of the Soviet Union's relaxation of its ideological grip. Mao was angered by the failure of the post-Stalin leadership to control what he regarded as the reactionary forces within the Communist bloc.

Mao was equally offended by the Soviet Union's adoption of a policy of *détente* towards the West. Moscow now seemed to accept that there were alternative ways of achieving revolution in the modern world other than by armed struggle. Khrushchev had by the late 1950s concluded that, in a world of nuclear **superpowers**, the Marxist-Leninist notion of a final violent conflict between the international proletariat and the forces of capitalism was no longer acceptable. He said that had comrade Lenin lived in a nuclear age he would have adjusted his views.

This was rejected by Mao as heresy. He believed that the final struggle was unavoidable and that it was the duty of all revolutionaries not only to prepare for it but also to hasten its coming. For Mao, Khrushchev's policy of *détente* was clear evidence that Soviet Communism had taken the revisionist path.

Vocabulary

Détente: the easing of tensions between the USSR and the West

Activity Ten:

Identify the tensions that developed within Sino-Soviet relations during 1956.

Mao's second visit to the USSR 1957

Disturbed by the disquiet in the Marxist camp, Khrushchev in 1957 convened a conference in Moscow of the world's Communist parties. His broad aim was to repair the differences between the USSR and the other Marxist countries. At the meeting, Mao was still prepared to recognise the USSR's unique place in Communist history. He also approved a Sino-Soviet declaration that expressed China's readiness to co-operate. But at the same time he let it be known that he regarded Moscow's approach to the West as too accommodating. He called on the Soviet Union to abandon **revisionism**, and return to the true Marxist-Leninist path. Rather than making concessions to capitalism, it was the Soviet Union's revolutionary duty to fight the international class war. This could not be done by extending peaceful overtures to class enemies, the imperialist Western nations.

What prompted Mao's words was his suspicion that the Soviet Union was following a policy of *détente* with the West in order to leave China internationally isolated. Mao's chief spokesman at the Moscow meeting was Deng Xiaoping, who excelled himself in putting over the Chinese version of international revolution. Deng argued powerfully that the proletarian world revolution was achievable only through armed struggle; capitalism had to be overcome by force. In a tense series of exchanges he got the better of the leading Soviet political theorists and won the admiration, if not the open support, of many of the other delegates. The Russian hosts were embarrassed and angered by Deng's performance.

Vocabulary

Revisionism: betraying original revolutionary ideals and values

Activity Eleven:

What were the differences between the attitudes of the Soviet Union and China towards the West?

The Taiwan issue

In 1958 the simmering Taiwan issue provided another test of the genuineness of Sino-Soviet sympathies. Without consulting Moscow, Mao ordered Chinese forces to make ready for full-scale assault on the Nationalist-held island (see page 96). The USA responded by preparing for war with mainland China. In the event, Mao held back from a direct attack on Taiwan. It is doubtful that he really intended to attack but the reason he gave for not doing so was that the USSR had declined to offer China even moral support.

Khrushchev countered by saying that he was unwilling to put the USSR at risk by recklessly 'testing the stability of the capitalist system'. He denounced Mao and the Chinese as **Trotskyists** who had lost all sense of political reality. The resulting deterioration in relations led the Soviet Union in 1959 to withdraw its economic advisers from China and to cancel its commercial contracts there.

Vocabulary

Trotskyists: followers of Stalin's rival, Leon Trotsky, who believed in the necessity of a world revolution at any cost.

China's walkout from the 1961 Moscow conference

It was the Albanian question that brought matters to a head and led to the severing of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the PRC. The occasion was Zhou Enlai's walkout from the 1961 Moscow Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to which China had been invited as an observer. Khrushchev's speech at the congress, abusing the Albanian Communist leaders for their backward Stalinist ways, was interpreted by the Chinese as a deliberately intended attack on themselves. Having expected such an onslaught, Zhou and the Chinese delegation quit the hall in accordance with a rehearsed plan. This dramatic gesture was the climax to a decade of Sino-Soviet recrimination. The collapse of diplomatic relations encouraged the Soviet and Chinese leaders to be still more offensive in their personal references to each other. Khrushchev abused Mao as an 'Asian Hitler' and 'a living corpse'. Mao responded by dismissing his Soviet adversary as 'a redundant old boot' that ought to be thrown into a corner.

One result of this flurry of insults was the sharpening of the disputes between the USSR and China along their common border. Mao angrily asserted that the refusal of the USSR to return the Chinese territories that Russia had acquired by the **unequal treaties** of the nineteenth century made it as guilty of imperialism as the original tsarist land grabbers. Beijing's news agency spoke of the 'anti-Chinese atrocities of the new Russian tsars'.

Vocabulary

Albania: run by an oppressive neo-Stalinist regime. It was the only Communist State in Europe to recognize China, rather than the USSR as leader of the international revolution.

Activity Twelve:

Why did Khrushchev denounce Mao as a Trotskyist in regards to Taiwan?

Securing borders & challenging US in the Cold War

Tibet and 17 point agreement

Independence for Tibet came in 1911, following the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty and the surrender of Chinese imperial troops to the Tibetan Army. From 1911 to the late 1940s, Tibet avoided most foreign influences and was considered to be an independent state. But in 1949-50, the newly founded People's Republic of China invaded the Himalayan nation, eventually occupying half the country by 1951. In May of that year, Tibet was forced to sign the so-called "17 Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet," which gave China control over the Tibetan region.

Resistance to the occupation grew as Chinese troops reportedly destroyed key religious structures and imprisoned monks and other community leaders. In 1959 Tibetans angrily rose up, conducting demonstrations in the capital of Lhasa. China crushed the opposition, reportedly killing some 87,000 people. The Dalai Lama, Tibet's head of state and spiritual leader, escaped and set up a base camp in Northern India.

Chinese rule of the mountainous region brought repression and hardship for many Tibetans. During China's Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1969, Chinese troops continued their destruction of prominent religious sites and monasteries. Tibetans were imprisoned and monks indoctrinated in massive "re-education" efforts. By 1979, an estimated 1.2 million Tibetans had died as a result of Chinese rule, according to charges leveled by the Tibetan government in exile.

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/china/overview/tibet.htm>

The PRC and the USA

There is a sense in which one would expect hostility to be a consistent feature of Sino-American relations. After all, they represented opposite ends of the political spectrum: the USA with its thriving capitalist system was a natural enemy of the PRC, which was ideologically committed to the destruction of capitalism within its own borders and worldwide. Mao's political instinct was to back all revolutionary movements wherever they occurred in the world, which was why from the earliest days of the PRC its agents were to be found in Latin America bidding to replace the Soviet Union as promoters of Communist revolution.

Initially, the USA held that the USSR and China were acting as a joint Communist bloc and it took some time for the reality of the deep Sino-Soviet fissure to be appreciated by the Americans. In the meantime, US perception of a joint Sino-Soviet conspiracy created an atmosphere in which Chinese Reds were feared as much in the USA as US imperialists were in China. One product of this was **McCarthyism**, which played its part in deepening Sino-American animosity.

However, the key diplomatic issue over which hostility was expressed was Taiwan. So long as Chiang Kai-shek and Mao were adamant in their refusal to recognise the claim of the other to dominion over the island, there could be no peaceful settlement. Adding to Mao's frustration was the USA's backing of Chiang's Nationalist China as a member of the UN, in denial of the PRC's place (see page 54). Mao continued throughout the 1950s to rattle the sabre over Taiwan, ordering troop movements and manoeuvres that seemed to be a prelude to invasion, though it is doubtful that he would have risked this without an unambiguous assurance of Soviet support, something which he never received. Nevertheless, he felt justified in taking an aggressive stance in the light of US actions, which included:

- supplying Chiang's illegal regime with finance and resources
- persuading the UN to impose a trade embargo on the PRC
- using the US Seventh Fleet to patrol the straits between Taiwan and the Communist mainland
- signing the mutual security pact in 1954 in which the USA pledged to support the GMD government and to defend Taiwan against attack from outside
- installing sophisticated weaponry on Taiwan, including missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.

In 1958 Mao made his most aggressive move yet when he instructed PLA shore batteries to shell the Nationalist-held islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The strength of the shelling suggested that a Communist Chinese assault on Taiwan was imminent. US vessels were also threatened in the Taiwan straits. The USA prepared for war. But no attack came from the mainland. Communist China was

not in a position to invade Taiwan. Mao judged that his forces did not possess the necessary air power and landing craft to mount a successful invasion of the well-defended island.

Vocabulary

McCarthyism: Senator Joe McCarthy headed a Congressional Committee seeking to expose Communists supposedly working in the USA. Relying on flimsy evidence, the committee was responsible for creating the Red Scare in the 1950s.

The nuclear issue

Sino-American relations were further strained by the nuclear issue. This was understandable, given that the USA was a nuclear power and that the PRC would not develop its own atomic bomb until 1964 (see page 111). Yet in public, whatever his private fears may have been, Mao showed his apparent disdain for the USA's nuclear weapons, referring to them as **paper tigers**. Source J gives Mao's explanation as to why the PRC was unafraid of them.

SOURCE J

From an article by Mao Zedong, 28 January 1955, quoted in Pei-kai Cheng and Michael Lestz, editors, *The Search for Modern China*, W.W. Norton, 1999, p. 382.

Today, the danger of a world war and the threats to China come mainly from the warmongers in the United States. They have occupied our Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and are contemplating an atomic war. We have two principles: first we don't want war; second we will strike back resolutely if anyone invades us. This is what we teach the members of the Communist Party and the whole nation. The Chinese people are not to be cowed by US blackmail. Our country has a population of 600 million and an area of 9,600,000 square kilometres. The United States cannot annihilate the Chinese nation with its small stack of atom bombs [nuclear weapons]. Even if the US atom bombs were so powerful that, when dropped on China, they would make a hole right through the earth, or even blow it up, that would hardly mean anything to the universe as a whole.

We have an expression, millet plus rifles. In the case of the United States, it is planes plus the A-bomb [atom bomb]. However, if the United States with its planes plus the A-bomb is to launch a war of aggression against China, then China with its millet plus rifles is sure to emerge the victor.

This may have been bravado; nevertheless it was an attitude that Mao sustained until the PRC itself became a superpower in the 1960s.

Activity Thirteen:

a) What happened in Tibet in 1950?

Sino Soviet Relations and the Bomb

The issue of coexistence

The continuing Sino-Soviet dispute over whether coexistence was compatible with true Marxism–Leninism was at its fiercest over the **test ban treaty** of 1963. Mao dismissed the treaty as another betrayal by the USSR of its revolutionary role. Instead of confronting imperialism, it was collaborating with it: ‘Soviet revisionists are uniting with the running dogs of capitalism.’

Mao pointed to what he saw as a fundamental flaw in the Soviet pursuit of peace with the West. In a formal statement in 1963, he declared that coexistence could operate only between equal nations, but since, in Marxist logic, all pre-revolutionary states were in subjection to the exploiting capitalist power, true equality did not exist. Therefore, it was impossible ‘to practise peaceful coexistence with the imperialists and their lackeys’. It was a betrayal of international socialism to pretend that there could be peaceful relations between ‘oppressed and oppressor classes and between oppressed and oppressor nations’.

Khrushchev retorted by accusing the Chinese of irresponsibility; they were being arrogant and dangerous in claiming to speak for the international working class. ‘We might ask the Chinese – what right have you to decide for us questions involving our very existence and our class struggle? – We too want socialism, but we want to win it through the class struggle, not by unleashing a world thermo-nuclear war.’ Khrushchev’s charge was that, rather than seek peace, the Chinese wished to see East and West destroy themselves in nuclear war, leaving China free to dominate what was left of the world. What gave particular irony to Khrushchev’s charge was that China was only a year away from exploding its own nuclear bomb.

China’s nuclear bomb

Ever since the early 1950s Mao Zedong had been unhappy with the attitude of Stalin and successive Soviet leaders towards the nuclear question. Moscow’s position was that if China wanted Soviet assistance in its nuclear programme it must give the USSR a controlling hand in the PRC’s defence policy. This was too much for Mao. The Soviet demand redoubled his determination to make China a superpower by achieving nuclear status unaided. In 1959 a particularly low point in Sino-Soviet relations was reached when the USSR decided to withdraw its scientists from the PRC. Nonetheless, China, undeterred, pressed on with

its own research programme. Chinese nuclear physicists painstakingly pieced together the records that the Soviet advisers had shredded before their hurried departure.

Such efforts brought their reward. In 1964, to great rejoicing with massed crowds singing 'The East is Red' in Mao's honour, Communist China detonated its first nuclear device. Three years later it produced its first hydrogen bomb. China's remarkable feat allowed it to mock the USSR's refusal to assist. The first Chinese bomb was codenamed 59/6, a reference to the year and month in which the Soviet technicians had withdrawn from China. Mao recorded gloatingly: 'This is the result of Khrushchev's "help". By withdrawing the experts he forced us to take our own road. We should give him a big medal.'

Mao's attitude to nuclear war

China's emergence as a nuclear power frightened the world. China seemed not to have the same awesome fear of nuclear war that the West and the USSR had. Mao referred to nuclear weapons as 'paper tigers' (see page 97). He told Khrushchev at one of their meetings that despite the awesome destructiveness of these weapons, the PRC was quite willing to contemplate nuclear war with its enemies. To Khrushchev's amazement, Mao casually informed him that China's population was so big that it would soon make up any losses it suffered, no matter how great the disaster.

This was in keeping with an earlier CCP statement which indicated China's belief that it could successfully survive a nuclear war: 'On the debris of a dead imperialism, the victorious Chinese people would create very swiftly a civilisation thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful future for themselves.' Mao believed that China's emergence as a superpower and its refusal to be frightened of paper tigers had confirmed its position as the true champion of the oppressed peoples of the world.

At the time of his fall from power in the USSR in 1964, Khrushchev was still trying to convince the rest of the Marxist world that the Maoist brand of communism was heretical. His policy of isolating China was continued by the collective leadership that superseded him. In the fierce Sino-Soviet propaganda war each side accused the other of a long list of crimes against communism. The USSR resurrected the spectre of the '**yellow peril**'. The bitter dispute was soon to be further deepened by the onset of China's Cultural Revolution.

Activity Fourteen:

a) Why did Mao dismiss the Test Ban Treaty?

b) What was the Soviet attitude towards the nuclear question and China?

c) What was project 59/6 and how was it achieved despite the withdrawal of Soviet experts?

d) Explain Mao's attitude towards the 'paper tigers'.

Sino-Africa Relations

Early years from 1956 to 1977:

China-Africa relations got off to a slow start after the first Asia-Africa Conference, the Bandung Conference, in 1955, as Beijing attempted to assert its leadership over the Third World and the nonaligned movement. Egypt became the first African country to establish diplomatic relations with China in May 1956. By the early 1960s, over 10 African countries, including Morocco, Algeria, and Sudan, had established diplomatic relations with China. By the end of the 1970s, 44 of the 50 independent African countries had entered into diplomatic relations with China.

China's early involvement in Africa was primarily centered on building ideological solidarity with other underdeveloped countries to advance Chinese-style communism. China supported independent movements in Africa, providing not only moral and rhetorical support, but also weapons and military training. China's Africa policy then served two main purposes: first, to counter recognition of Taiwan as the representative of China and thus to shore up votes for the eventual rejection of Taiwan's China credentials in the United Nations; second, to counter the West's influence and then the Soviet Union's influence on the continent.

During these times of political orientation, economic aid was provided to Africa gratis even though China's own economic circumstances were far from optimal. By Western standards, China's aid programs, marking its early engagements with African countries, were paltry. For the two decades from the mid-1950s to mid-1970s, China gave about \$2.5 billion to 36 African countries in aid. China also sent ten thousand engineers, doctors and technicians to provide assistances for African development, and undertook various infrastructure projects, one of which was the 1860-kilometer long Tanzania-Zambia railway, financed and built by China, and hailed as a monument of China-Africa friendship upon its completion. Through those aid programs China gained a good reputation among Africans. In retrospect, China's contemporary engagement with Africa has its roots in policies pursued during this early period. The ultimate achievement of China's Africa policy during this period was that the People's Republic of China (PRC) replaced the Taiwan-based Republic of China (ROC) as a member of the United Nation in 1971 with help from African countries.

<https://sites.google.com/site/chinapolicyinfocus/china-s-return-to-africa/the-history-of-sino-africa-relations>

Admission of China to the UN

On Oct. 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly voted to admit the People's Republic of China (mainland China) and to expel the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Communist P.R.C. therefore assumed the R.O.C.'s place in the General Assembly as well as its place as one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

The New York Times, in the [Oct. 27 edition](#), described the reaction at the United Nations: "After the tension and drama of last night, today was spent in efforts at reconciliation and in

political introspection and analysis.” It also noted, “Secretary General Thant appealed to all members to ‘endorse the tremendous step forward’ represented by Peking’s admission and to set aside suspicion and bitterness.”

The Republic of China had been a member of the United Nations from the organization’s formation in 1945, at which time it still governed all of China. However, in 1949, the R.O.C. government was expelled from the mainland by the Communist Party, the founders of the People’s Republic of China.

Though the R.O.C. only continued to control the island of Taiwan after its expulsion from the mainland, it still considered itself the one true government of China. This view was supported by the Western powers in allowing the R.O.C. to remain China’s representative in the United Nations. Their main motive? They wanted to prevent another Communist government from gaining a place in the Security Council.

By 1971, however, the People’s Republic had gained enough international support for the U.N. General Assembly to pass the resolution declaring that it, and not the R.O.C., was the rightful representative of China. The resolution specified that it was a “restoration of the lawful rights” to the P.R.C., indicating that the country had been denied its rightful seat since 1949.

The United States, the most significant opponent of the resolution, then argued for the P.R.C. to be admitted separately from the R.O.C., which would have allowed the R.O.C. to retain its spot. The proposal was defeated.

Connect to Today:

The Republic of China, which has largely relinquished its claim to mainland China, has continued to fight for a place in the United Nations. Over the years, it has [applied to the U.N.](#) under the name “The Republic of China (Taiwan)” and “The Republic of China on Taiwan,” but the applications have been denied. The U.S. supports a “one China” policy, which maintains that, though the People’s Republic does not hold sovereignty over Taiwan, there is only one China that includes both the mainland and Taiwan. It has not supported Taiwan’s applications for membership, objecting to what it perceives as “an effort to change the fragile status quo that has governed relations among the three.”

<https://learning.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/25/oct-25-1971-peoples-republic-of-china-in-taiwan-out-at-un/>

<p>Activity Fifteen:</p>

a) Analyse Chinese support of independence movement in the 1960s

b) Describe the changing position of China within the UN from 1945 to 1971.

The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962

A dramatic Cold War episode in 1962 provided China with the opportunity to ridicule the Soviet Union's claim to the leadership of world revolution. In October of that year, the USSR exploited its influence over **Communist Cuba** to install rockets and nuclear warheads on the island. Since Cuba stood only 145 km (90 miles) off the coast of the USA, President Kennedy demanded the withdrawal of the weapons. After a tense stand-off Khrushchev complied. The two superpowers then made a compromise settlement in which the USSR

agreed to withdraw all its weapons and installations in Cuba in return for the USA's promise never to invade the island and to withdraw its own nuclear weapons from Turkey.

China scorned Moscow for its original 'adventurism' in siting detectable nuclear warheads in Cuba and for its subsequent 'capitulationism' in abjectly bowing to the US threat to retaliate. Was this, Mao asked contemptuously, the way to inspire the world's struggling masses in their fight against US imperialism?

Pillar Five: Castro's Cuba (1959 - 1962)

Focus of Study

This pillar highlights the spread of the Cold War into the Western Hemisphere and analyzes the US response during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Objective:

❖ **Analyze** the consequences of Castro coming to power in Cuba

Pillar Two Key Terms

Bay of Pigs invasion: a failed military invasion of Cuba undertaken by a CIA-sponsored paramilitary group on 17th April 1961. Launched from Guatemala and Nicaragua, the invading force was defeated within three days.

Embargo: commercial, financial and economic embargo imposed by the US on Cuba. The initial embargo on sales of arms to the Batista regime on 14th March 1958 was expanded on October 19th 1960 to include all exports to Cuba except for food and medicine after Cuba nationalized American owned oil refineries without compensation. On February 7th 1962 the embargo was extended to almost all imports.

Fidel Castro (1926-2016): Political leader of Cuba from 1959 to 2008 who transformed his country into the first communist state in the Western Hemisphere.

26th of July Movement: Movement led by Fidel Castro which overthrew the regime of Fulgencio Batista in Cuba, named to commemorate an attack on the Santiago de Cuba army barracks on July 26, 1953.

Activity Sixteen

Write your own response to this question using what you have learnt from the video notes and your prior reading about this crisis:

Who won in the Cuban Missile Crisis? What criteria did you use to make that assessment?

